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Abstract. Most of the current cloud computing platforms offer Infras-
tructure as a Service (IaaS) model, which aims to provision basic virtual-
ized computing resources as on-demand and dynamic services. Neverthe-
less, a single cloud provider may not have limitless resources to offer to
its users, hence the notion of an Inter-Cloud environment where a cloud
can use the infrastructure resources of other clouds. However, there is no
common framework in existence that allows the service owners to seam-
lessly provision even some basic services across multiple cloud service
providers, albeit not due to any inherent incompatibility or proprietary
nature of the foundation technologies on which these cloud platforms are
built. In this paper we present a novel solution which aims to cover a
gap in a subsection of this problem domain. Our solution offers a se-
curity architecture that enables service owners to provision a dynamic
and service-oriented secure virtual private network on top of multiple
cloud IaaS providers. It does this by leveraging the scalability, robust-
ness and flexibility of peer-to-peer overlay techniques to eliminate the
manual configuration, key management and peer churn problems en-
countered in setting up the secure communication channels dynamically,
between different components of a typical service that is deployed on
multiple clouds. We present the implementation details of our solution
as well as experimental results detailing the overheads of our solution
carried out on two commercial clouds.
1 Introduction
Most of the currently available Cloud Computing solutions are mainly focused on
providing functionalities and services at the infrastructure level, e.g., improved
performance for virtualization of compute, storage and network resources, as well
as necessary fundamental functionality such as Virtual Machine (VM) migrations
and server consolidation etc. In the cases where higher-level and more abstract
concerns like dynamic configuration and application level security are needed to
be addressed, existing Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) solutions tend to focus
on functional aspects only. Furthermore, if a cloud’s computational and storage
infrastructure resources are overloaded due to increased workloads, its service
towards it clients will degrade. The idea of an Inter-Cloud [1] has been gaining
much traction to address such a situation, where a cloud can borrow the required
infrastructure resources of other clouds. However, in order to progress from a
basic cloud service infrastructure to a more adaptable cloud service ecosystem,
there is a great need for tools and services that support and provide higher-level
concerns and non-functional aspects in a comprehensive manner, e.g., automatic
provisioning of value-added services like application and communication security.
The OPTIMIS project [2] has been a recently completed effort in this regard,
which strived to provide a holistic approach to cloud service provisioning by of-
fering a single abstraction for multiple coexisting cloud architectures. OPTIMIS
addressed various high-level concerns in this domain like trust, risk, eco-efficiency
and cost, however a major concern of high importance is the provisioning of a
secure communication framework to the services utilizing the resources of dif-
ferent cloud IaaS providers. The usage pattern of these services is usually quite
flexible. on one hand they might be directly accessed and managed by end-users,
and on the other hand their access and management might be brokered and or-
chestrated by Cloud Service Providers (CSP) or third-party Cloud Brokers [3]
for their customers.
There are three fundamental steps in the life cycle of a service in a cloud
computing ecosystem; the construction of the service, the deployment of the
service to one or more IaaS clouds and lastly the operational management of the
service. In the resulting scenarios, the presence of multiple IaaS providers in the
cloud ecosystem is the key issue that needs to be addressed by any inter-cloud
security solution. A major goal of service owners is to select IaaS providers in
an efficient way in order to host the different components of their services on
appropriate clouds. In this respect, third-party cloud brokers [3] can play a major
role in simplifying the use, performance and delivery of the cloud services. These
brokers can also offer an inter-mediation layer spanning across multiple cloud
providers to deliver a host of optimization and value-added services which take
advantage of the myriad individual cloud services e.g., aggregation of different
services or arbitration for a best-match service from multiple similar services.
For the numerous interaction possibilities among these parties, whatever the
usage scenarios maybe, the security of data and the communication between the
consumers of the service and its multiple providers is of paramount importance.
In the light of the above discussion, it is advocated that an inter-cloud secu-
rity solution is highly desirable that would provide a framework enabling seam-
less and secure communication between the actors of a cloud ecosystem over
multiple cloud platforms. Such a solution, however, has to overcome a number
of challenges because of architectural limitations. This is because most of the
current cloud service platforms, and the multi-tenants environments they offer,
make it difficult to give the consumers of their services flexible and scalable
control over the core security aspects of their services like encryption, communi-
cation isolation and key management. Secure communication is also challenged
by lack of dynamic network configurability in most cloud providers, caused by the
inherent limitations of the fixed network architectures offered by these providers.
In this work we address the security concerns related to flexibility, scalability
and overheads that in our view must be overcome in order to provide holis-
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tic provisioning of services to consumers from multiple cloud service providers.
We present the design and architecture of an inter-cloud secure communica-
tion framework that offers the features of dynamic and scalable virtual network
formation, efficient and scalable key management and minimal manual configu-
ration. This framework enables secure and private communication between the
components of a service utilising resources of multiple cloud platforms. Our
peer-to-peer architecture provides a single virtual network to that service as an
overlay of resources from multiple cloud providers and offers the capability to
efficiently and transparently run services on top of this network while catering
for the dynamic growth and shrinkage of the components of the service.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the
background and related works that address the issues related to this domain.
In Section 3 we elaborate on the detailed Inter-Cloud Virtual Private Network
(ICVPN) architecture. In Section 4 we present our experimental setup and the
analysis of the performance results and overheads of our solution. We conclude
in Section 5 with the future directions of our work.
2 Related Work
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) have been a mainstay for providing secure re-
mote access over wide-area networks to resources in private organizational net-
works for a long time. Well-known tools and softwares like OpenVPN [4] are
used to create secure point-to-point or site-to-site connections for authenticated
remote access. However, the main problem in client/server based approaches is
that they require centralized servers to manage the life cycle of all the secure
connections for the participating clients, hence suffering from a single point-of-
failure. Another issue is the quite complex and error prone configuration prob-
lems especially if you want to construct and manage a large-scale network not
having a relatively simple topology, as it would require customized configuration
on every client and even more elaborate management and routing configuration
on the server-side. Another major drawback is the complexity of key distribu-
tion among all the participating clients in a VPN, as the software itself does not
provide any key distribution service and all keys have to be manually transferred
to individual hosts. In case of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model, an
additional requirement of a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) exists that has
to issue individual certificates to all the servers and clients constituting a VPN,
which incurs an additional communication overhead when forming a virtual pri-
vate network.
There have been some other VPN solutions for large-scale networks aimed
at grid and cluster computing environments, such as VIOLIN [5] and VNET [6],
that do not follow a strict client/server model based approach. VNET is a layer
2 virtual networking tool that relies on a VNET server running on a Virtual
Machine Monitor (VMM) hosting a virtual machine in a remote network which
establishes an encrypted tunnel connection to a VNET server running on a ma-
chine (called Proxy) inside the users home network. All of the remote virtual
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machines communication goes through this tunnel and the goal of the Proxy is
to emulate the remote virtual machine as a local host on the users home net-
work, in effect presenting it as a member of the same LAN. The motivation of
this approach is to tackle the users lack of administrative control at remote grid
sites to manipulate network resources like routing and resource reservations etc.
but it suffers from the previously discussing problem of complex and manual
configuration though going for the simplicity of a private LAN. Also the scala-
bility will be a big issue for the Proxy as the number of remote virtual machines
grows as each will require a secure tunnel connection and corresponding virtual
network interface mapped to the Proxys network interface by the VNET server
software.
VIOLIN is a small-scale virtual network with virtual routers, switches and
end hosts implemented in software and hosted by User-Mode Linux (UML) en-
abled machines as virtual appliances. It allows for the dynamic establishment
of a private layer 3 virtual network among virtual machines, however, it doesnt
offer dynamic or automatic network deployment or route management to setup
the virtual network. Virtual links are established between the virtual appliances
using encrypted UDP tunnels that have to be manually setup and are not self-
configuring, making it cumbersome to establish inter-host connections in flexible
and dynamic fashion.
P2P VPN solutions like Hamachi [7] and N2N [8] have come up as peer-to-
peer alternatives to centralized and client/server model based VPNs. Hamachi
is a shareware application that is capable of establishing direct links between
computers that are behind NAT firewalls. A backend cluster of servers are used
to enable NAT traversal and establish direct peer-to-peer connections among its
clients. Each client establishes and maintains a control connection to the server
cluster. It is mainly used for internet gaming and remote administration but
suffers from scalability issues as each peer has to maintain the connection with
the server as well as any other peers it wants to communicate with, ending up
with the overhead of a mesh-topology. It therefore offers limited number of peers
(16 per virtual network) and limited number of concurrent clients (50 per virtual
network). The keys used for connection encryption and authentication are also
controlled by the vendors servers and individual users do not initially control
who has access to their network.
N2N is a layer 2 VPN solution which doesn’t require a centralized back-end
cluster of servers like Hamachi but it uses a peer-to-peer overlay network similar
to Skype, where a number of dedicated super-nodes are used as relay agents for
edge nodes that cannot communicate directly with each other due to firewall or
NAT restrictions. The edge nodes connect to a super-node at start-up and pre-
shared TwoFish [9] keys are used for link encryption. As it operates on layer 2,
the users of the overlay have to configure their IP addresses etc. It also assumes
node membership as relatively static with edge nodes rarely leaving or joining
the network over their life cycle.
More recently, some commercial cloud computing services have been made
available by different vendors that provide a virtual private network inside their
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public cloud offering and offering the customers some limited degree of control
over this network, which is called a Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). Prime exam-
ples in this domain are Amazon Virtual Private Cloud [10], Google Secure Data
Connector [11] and CohsiveFT VPN-Cubed [12]. These are aimed at enterprise
customers to allow them to access their resource deployed on the vendor’s cloud
over an IPSec [13] based virtual private network. Although these products al-
low the possibility of leveraging the cloud providers’ APIs to flexibly grow and
shrink their networks, the management and configuration is as complex as a
traditional network as components of the VPC such as internet gateways, VPN
servers, NAT instances and subnets have to be managed by the customers them-
selves. Furthermore, the customers are required to setup an IPSec device on their
premises that connects to an IPSec gateway in the VPC running as a virtual
appliance which integrates the enterprises network with the VPC subnet in the
cloud. Most importantly, with the exception of [12], these solutions are locked
to single cloud vendor and [12] provides use of a selective set of cloud providers
by placing its virtual appliances as VPN gateways in these cloud infrastructures
and allowing the customers to join these gateways in a mesh topology manually.
3 Design and Architecture
In this section we present the design and architecture of our inter-cloud secure
communication framework, the Inter-Cloud VPN (ICVPN). The architecture
is inspired by two main techniques, namely Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Overlays [14]
and VPNs [15]. Network virtualization techniques like VPNs and P2P Overlays
have been shown to provide their users legacy communication functionalities
of their native network environments, despite the topology, configuration and
management architecture of the actual underlying physical network. This fits
perfectly with our goal of providing a secure virtual private network as a service
to the consumers operating on top of multiple cloud providers. All complications
and complexities of managing a physical network can be handled by the overlay
network, enabling the services deployed on multiple clouds to benefit from a
customized communication network typically only available in physical local-
area environments.
3.1 Peer-to-Peer Overlay
The core technique employed by the ICVPN is the use of two tiers of P2P over-
lays. A Universal Overlay (UO) forms the higher tier overlay and is used to
provide a scalable and secure service infrastructure to initiate and bind multiple
lower tier VPN overlays (VO) to different cloud services. The universal over-
lay can be initiated either by the service owner, a cloud broker or the cloud
service providers. Its main purpose is to help with the bootstrapping activity
of VPN peers of the VPN overlay. It also provides other functionalities such
as service advertisement, service discovery mechanisms, and service code provi-
sioning, with minimal requirement for manual configuration and administration.
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This approach acts as an aggregation service for the peered overlay resources
(which in this case are virtual machines) span across multiple cloud domains to
help form a virtual private network. The peers of the universal overlay act as
super peers for the nodes of the underlying VPN overlays and let new nodes
enrol, authenticate, bootstrap and join a particular VPN overlay based on the
cloud service requiring a VPN service.
Fig. 1. Two-tiered overlay architecture for the Inter-Cloud VPN solution
As depicted in Fig.1, the service owner/provider or the cloud broker could
itself be a peer in the universal overlay and a subset of the universal overlay peers
can act as super-peers for the peer nodes of the VPN overlay for a particular
cloud service. This enables the service owner/provider or the cloud broker to
publish and propagate configuration and other data throughout the universal
overlay. This is done by using its super peer as the initial dissemination point
and then taking advantage of the scalable content-sharing capabilities of the
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) feature of the overlay. The universal overlay
peers can join and leave the system dynamically and additional VMs from the
cloud providers can be provisioned to act as the universal overlay peers as well.
To join the universal overlay, each peer needs to acquire a unique identifica-
tion number (PID). This is generated by the peer itself on its first initialization
on a VM as a unique 160-bit random number. It also needs some bootstrap-
ping data to validate itself with a super peer for admission into the overlay. The
bootstrapping data consists of the IP addresses of the super peers, the ID of the
service that this particular VM belongs to and some security-related parameters
described later. This data is embedded in a secure cache on the VM by a VM
contextualization service [16] when it is provisioned for the service deployment
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and the same contextualization service is used to install the peer-to-peer client
in the VM.
Once the peer has joined its overlay, it needs to discover its neighbours and
gather additional configuration data to establish secure tunnels with them so
that the deployed service can communicate securely with its different compo-
nents deployed on different cloud platforms. In order to achieve this, we use the
following scheme based on the Functional Encryption predicates.
3.2 Secure Service based Resource Discovery
After joining a peer-to-peer overlay, each peer needs to discover its neighbours
for the resources they provide to achieve the secure communication goals of the
application using the overlay. Most commonly these resources are configuration
and credentials data and the secure communication goals of a typical application
pertain to encryption of traffic associated with specific ports and protocols. In
most structured P2P systems, the peers must maintain lists of neighbours to
achieve this goal efficiently. To populate these lists, peers in a structured over-
lay usually use distributed trackers or IP Multicast [17]. Although IP multicast
offers the feature of scalable group communication needed for efficient resource
delivery, it is not suitable for use in our system architecture, this is mainly due
to its very limited deployment by ISPs and network carriers as well as the com-
plexity of its architectural design [18]. A P2P tracker is a specialised service
that introduces other peers of an overlay to the requesting peer. In order to
perform this function, a tracker keeps track of peers as soon as they make a
request. A tracker may be deployed as a dedicated server or distributed among
the peers of an overlay it self. At first glance the distributed trackers based ap-
proach looks very suitable for use in our system architecture as it maps nicely
with the functionality of the peers of the universal overlay i.e. well known boot-
strapping points. However, this approach is vulnerable to malicious attacks like
Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Sybil attacks [19], in which the attacker can subvert
the functioning of a peer-to-peer overlay by creating and using a large number
of false identities. For ICVPN we focus on the Sybil attack where a malicious
attacked can impersonate a number of the Universal Overlay peers to subvert
the process of resource discovery.
A common way of dealing with this issue is to use some trusted authority
to allocate peer IDs to the participating peers and the peers validate each other
by querying the central authority with a validation request. In our model, it can
work by designating a set of super peers as the Certificate Authorities (CA) for
the overlays other peers. The CA can assign peer IDs to the peers and signs a
certificate that binds the serviceID of the cloud service making use of our solution
and peer ID within the public certificate of the peer for a limited time duration.
The peer then can use this signed certificate to authenticate itself with other
peers in the overlay. However, using this Trusted Third Party (TTP) model
to validate peers and allocate them their identities can introduce substantial
communicational and computational overhead, especially as the number of peers
in the overlay increases. We propose a decentralized solution that overcomes the
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above mentioned scalability problems by utilizing a functional encryption based
scheme [20].
In a generic functional encryption scheme, a decryption key describes a func-
tion of the encrypted data to the user. This function F (·, ·) is modelled as a
Turing Machine [21] and an authority possessing a master secret key (msk) can
generate a key skk that can be used to compute the function F (k, ·) on some
encrypted data. Identity-Based Encryption [22], [23], [24], Searchable Encryp-
tion [25] and Attribute-Based Encryption [26] are some examples of a Functional
Encryption scheme. To describe it more formally but briefly, A functional en-
cryption scheme (FE) for a functionality F dened over (K, X) is a sequence of
four algorithms (setup, keygen, encryption, decryption) satisfying the following
correctness condition for all k ∈ K and x ∈ X is given in Table 1.
Table 1. Four-tuple Functional Encryption
Sequence Explanation
setup(1) → (pp,msk) Generate a public and master secret key pair
keygen(mk, k) → sk Generate secrekt key for k
enc(pp, x) → c Encrypt message x
dec(sk, c) → y Use sk to decrypt c
For ICVPN, we employ a special case of Functional Encryption which falls
under the category of systems known as the predicate encryption schemes with
public index. For our scheme we make use of the system defined in [26] as
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), where the decision that which users can
decrypt a ciphertext is based on the attributes and policies associated with the
plaintext message and the user. In this scheme an authority creates secret keys
for the users of the system based on attributes or policies for each user and any-
one can encrypt a plaintext message by incorporating the appropriate attributes
or policies in the scheme. We describe the simplified step-wise description of our
version of this scheme as follows:-
i. A super peer sets up its own Master Secret ms and Public Parameters pp
ii. The super peer generates a private key for itself using the attributes Ser-
viceID and SuperPeerID as the public key i.e. PubSP = ServiceID ∧
SuperPeerID, for each service the super peer is managing
iii. After bootstrapping, the VPN peer sends a provisioning request to the super
peer encrypted by the super peers public key (PubSP )
iv. The super peer issues a private key to the VPN peer encrypted by its own
private key, against the public key with attributes PubV PN = VMID ∧
PeerID ∧ ServiceID
v. The super peer inserts the VPN peers public key in the universal overlay
DHT to keep a record of issued private keys, against the key(ServiceID) =
value(List of VMID) and for each peer; key(VMIDi) = value(PubV PNi)
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vi. The VPN peer query the universal overlay DHT for lists of other peers and
gets the result of key(ServiceID) encrypted using PubV PNx = PeerID ∧
ServiceID
In Section 5 we show the evaluation results of the performance overhead of
using our secure resource discovery scheme as compared to that using a PKI-
based approach described earlier in this section.
3.3 Secure Virtual Private Connections
The key feature of our ICVPN is establishing a secure communication network
between the peers of the overlay formed over a collection of cloud providers in-
frastructure. Therefore, after successfully joining the overlay network to become
part of a service, a VPN peer starts the process of creating secure tunnels to
the other peers of the service it wants to communicate with, according to the
functional operations of that particular service. To achieve this, we make use
of IPSec [13] to authenticate and encrypt each IP packet of a communication
session between the peers, thus creating end-to-end tunnels which provide pro-
tection against eavesdropping, message tempering and message forgeries. For
establishing mutual authentication between peers at the beginning of the ses-
sion and negotiation of cryptographic keys to be used during the session, we
employ the Internet Key Exchange protocol [27], which can make use of stan-
dard cryptographic primitives like public key cryptography [28] and AES [29].
In our approach, we make use of an authenticated Diffie-Hellman based scheme
to derive a secure session key which is used in the AES-CBC mode to ensure the
confidentiality of the traffic exchanges between the peers using the tunnel [30].
The session keys generated for the IPSec communication are valid for a short
period of time and when the keys expire the protocol is run again to come up
with new session keys to maintain the IPSec tunnels.
Another practical advantage of this approach is the reuse of existing frame-
works and tools which have been thoroughly tried and tested in a myriad of
different domains, are widely used and have been adopted in both academic
and commercial domain. The main components of the peer-to-peer client used
to construct a virtual private network in our model are shown in Fig. 2. These
include the standard components required to form a structured peer-to-peer
overlay like the Distributed Hash Table (DHT) service, which basically acts as
the command-and-control channel for the ICVPN solution, key-based routing,
peer discovery, bootstrapping service and overlay maintenance service. All of
these services are provided by a modified Kademlia implementation. In addition
to these peer-to-peer specific components, we have a secure content storage for
the client where sensitive data like keys, passwords, and security tokens etc. are
stored. The configuration component is integrated with the overlays DHT so
that the clients behaviour can be modified dynamically by push new configura-
tions to it from the super peers. The configuration component manages both the
peer-to-peer related configurations as well as the policies used to configure the
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Fig. 2. Architecture of a P2P client in the VPN overlay
IPSec tunnels between the peers for the use of the higher-level services using the
client to provide the secure communication framework.
The P2P client software sets up and configures the IPSec security associations
according the service network security policy, which is advertised by the service
owner through the DHT of the Universal Overlay. The peers of the underlying
VPN overlay periodically check for any update in the security policy and apply
and enforce any changes on the kernel of the VM through the P2P client’s IPSec
interface.
4 Implementation
We implement a working prototype of ICVPN using the Java programming lan-
guage on virtual machines running the Linux operating system. Our implemen-
tation is built using open source libraries and APIs. Specifically, we use the
BouncyCastle library [31] for most of the cryptographic operations, the cpabe
library [32] for the Functional Encrytion based secure resource discovery, and the
TomP2P library [33] for its implementation of the Kademlia [34] peer-to-peer
protocol and the overlay DHT. In addition, we use BT Compute Cloud [35] and
Flexiant Cloud [36] as our cloud service providers.
5 Evaluation
In this section we present the results of a series of experiments we conducted to
evaluate the effect of our prototype ICVPN solution upon the network perfor-
mance of a service deployed on two different cloud IaaS providers. We use a 3-tier
web service comprising of database, business logic and presentation components
deployed on nine virtual machines hosted on the clouds of British Telecom Ltd.
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and Flexiant Ltd., our partners in the EU OPTIMIS project. The purpose of
these experiments is to evaluate the architecture being proposed, in terms of
service latency and service throughput, in a practical scenario with a service de-
ployed over a real wide-area network, with the BT cloud geographically located
in Ipswich, England and Flexiant cloud located in Livingston, Scotland.
5.1 Service Latency
We define service latency as the inter-cloud round-trip time taken by a HTTP
request, issued by a service component on one cloud, to get a response from the
target service component on a different cloud. We compare the latency between
the components of the service deployed on different cloud providers, as the la-
tency between the components in the same cloud is almost negligible as they are
usually hosted on the same hyper-visor. We measured the latency by using the
round-trip delay of an HTTP HEAD request/response pair, as the components of
the web service communicate with each other using HTTP protocol and ICMP,
the de facto latency measurement protocol, is blocked in the networks of our
cloud providers. We measured the latency readings by running 10 experiments
very hour for a period of 24 hours, firstly without using the ICVPN solution
and then with it.
Fig. 3. Service latency of 240 round-trip time experiments from BT to Flexiant clouds
Looking at the results shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we can see that using
our solution only has a small impact on the HTTP latency, increasing it just
by about 5%. For ease of analysis, we collect the network traffic dump when
running our experiments, using the tcpdump packet sniffer. We found out from
the traffic dumps that the increased delay we encountered is mostly due to the
additional packets transmitted and received by the peers for the purposes of key
exchange and cryptographic primitives negotiation when establishing an IPSec
tunnel. After this initial handshake phase is over, the latency performance is
almost same in the comparative experiments.
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Fig. 4. Service latency of 240 round-trip time experiments from Flexiant to BT clouds
5.2 Service Throughput
We define service throughput as the inter-cloud network throughput between
service components deployed on different clouds. We measure the throughput
between components of the service deployed on different cloud providers by using
Iperf [37], a commonly used network testing tool. We measured the throughput
in both directions by transferring 30 MB data, a size chosen empirically to
saturate the WAN links between the components and get the throughput results
representing realistic conditions. We obtained the throughput measurements by
running 10 experiments every hour for a period of 10 hours, firstly without using
the ICVPN solution and then applying the security policy to tunnel the traffic
through IPSec.
Fig. 5. Service throughput of 240 data transmission experiments in both directions
between BT and Flexiant clouds
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From the throughput results shown in Fig. 5, the first thing that stands out
is the difference in the throughput values depending on the direction of transfer-
ring the data. Although we don’t have the detailed knowledge of the underlying
physical wide-area network connectivity between the two cloud service providers,
such readings are not unheard of in this domain and are usually due to differ-
ences in upstream and downstream traffic conditions, different routes chosen by
the IP packets or network configuration issues. Irrespective of that, by looking
at the comparative results it is clear that we just incur a small overhead in the
throughput, of about 10%. By analysing the traffic dumps generated from the
throughout test, we can attribute this overhead to the IKE and IPSec hand-
shakes in addition to the extra time taken by the VM kernel in encrypting and
encapsulating 30 MB of data for each throughput test.
5.3 Secure Resource Discovery Overheads
One of the main overheads in peer-to-peer overlays related to the cost of the
resource discovery after the peers have bootstrapped. Securing this process fur-
ther adds to this overhead but in an effort to characterise the effect of our
secure resource discovery mechanism, we compare it with an alternate design of
a PKI-based system where the super peers have the functionality of a Certifi-
cate Authority (CA), each peer is issued a signed certificate upon authenticated
completion of the bootstrapping process and queries the Universal Overlay DHT
for resource discovery and gets the resulting data back which is encrypted by
the owning peer using its private key.
Fig. 6. Secure resource discovery for 100 runtime analysis between PKI and Functional
Encryption approaches
We remove the cost of the DHT lookups from our measurements as their
theoretical complexity is known to be O log(n) for Kademlia DHT but due to
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the nature of actual runtime measurements they can add unhelpful noise to the
data. We define the runtime cost for both designs as the time duration between
the start and end of the secure resource discovery process.
From the results shown in Fig. 6, the mean runtime of the PKI-based design is
1313.52 milli-seconds whereas that for our Functional Encryption based scheme
is 338.81 milli-seconds. This shows that our scheme incurs about 74.2% less
overhead than a PKI based scheme.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a secure communication framework for services de-
ployed in an inter-cloud environment. We employ the robustness and scalability
afforded by structure peer-to-peer overlays to join virtual machines running on
different cloud IaaS providers with each other using IPSec tunnels, hence pro-
viding confidentiality, authentication and integrity for all the data exchanged
between different components of a cloud service. Our solution needs minimal
manual configuration as peers are automated to discover the information needed
to perform their operations from the Universal Overlay. We also provide a dis-
tributed and scalable key management solution for the consumption of the vir-
tual machines to set-up the secure communication channels. Our solution sup-
ports the dynamic addition and removal of nodes from the VPN overlay as we use
the peer-to-peer DHT not just as a command and control channel for managing
the VPN peers but also for the churn management of peers in the VPN overlay.
We have evaluated a prototype implementation based on experiments conducted
in realistic conditions, over multiple cloud infrastructure environments and found
minimal latency, throughput and security overheads of creating and maintaining
the ICVPN connections among the participating VMs of a service.
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